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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews past experiments and visits some of the major results in the literature of 
behavioral-, experimental-, and neuro-economics research with the ultimatum and the dictator 
games. Synthesis of the findings is offered.  
 
“One may wonder whether Adam Smith, were he working today, would not be a 
neuroeconomi[st]”  
Aldo Rustichini 2005 
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Introduction 
Some of the limitations of the Homo economicus models of game-theory are effectively 
illustrated by robust empirical findings from games, such as the ultimatum game, dictator game, 
trust game, prisoners’ dilemma, and public goods games. In lab experiments, game-theoretic 
equilibrium outcomes are typically not achieved by the participants. Robust experimental 
research results suggest that there are many factors included in human decision-making that are 
not included in the predicted game theoretic equilibrium of decision-making. Economics and 
game theory are based on the assumption that people can predict the actions of others; backward 
induction, iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and the Nash Equilibrium (NE) require a 
system of beliefs about the decisions of others. These concepts are based on people 
understanding others’ motives and beliefs (Tania Singer, Ernst Fehr 2005). This dissertation 
focuses on understanding two motives, generosity and stinginess, by playing two economic 
games: ultimatum game (UG) and dictator game (DG) in laboratory environment under the 
influence of two naturally occurring hormone neuropeptides, oxytocin (OT) and arginine 
vasopressin (AVP), which are administered to half of the subjects, leaving the other half on 
placebo.   
In each game two anonymous subjects play one-shot games with their show-up fee, 
which they are dividing between themselves in some manner. The purpose and the strategy of the 
two games are different. In the DG, decision-maker1 (DM1) receives $10 and is told that he may 
send any part of that to an anonymous person in the room (DM2). DM1 may decide to send no 
money at all and DM2 must accept that decision. There is no further exchange, the game is over. 
Sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium (SGPNE) suggests that DM1 earns $10 and DM2 $0, but in 
laboratory experiments the average amount sent is between $1.50 and $5 dependent upon how 
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(blind, double-blind, known identity) and where (what country) the game is played, with the 
mean offers of 20% of the stash, and around 20% of the subjects send the NE of $0 (various 
studies summarized by (Colin Camerer 2003) pages 57-58).  The UG incorporates an additional 
step: DM2 may reject DM1’s offer, in which case neither of them earns any money. Thus, the 
strategy here for DM1 is to allocate “just enough” money to DM2 to have the offer accepted, in 
which case they both earn the amount agreed to. The Sub-Game Perfect NE in the UG is $9 to 
DM1 and $1 to DM2 but in laboratory experiments this is rarely achieved. Offers range between 
$3 or $4 and offers smaller than $3 are rejected by half of the participants; about 75% of  the 
subjects send an even split (Werner Güth et al. 1982;Daniel Kahneman et al. 1986;Joseph 
Patrick Henrich et al. 2005;Colin F. Camerer, Richard H. Thaler 1995;Colin Camerer 2003) 
(pages 50-55). In the UG, DM1 needs to have some understanding of what is acceptable to offer 
so that DM2 will accept.  
It is widely accepted that human social bonds are characterized by acts of altruism 
(Stephanie L. Brown, R. Michael Brown 2005;Herbert Gintis et al. 2003;Herbert Gintis 2002). 
Humans are known to benefit others at a cost to themselves in a variety of way. Reciprocal 
altruism is a form of altruism in which the altruist is in direct exchange with the recipient of the 
benefit and is expecting a reciprocation for the help provided (Robert L. Trivers 1971). This type 
of altruism is found in the trust game (TG), in which DM1 can send any part of his lab-given 
endowment to DM2. The amount sent triples en route to DM2, who can choose to send any part 
of the triple-stash back. The SGPNE for DM1 is to send $0 to DM2 but in lab experiments, 
typically 40% of the money is sent to DM2s who send back about a third of the tripled amount 
(Colin Camerer 2003).  Another type of altruism, introduced by Richard Alexander, is indirect 
altruism (also called indirect reciprocity) (R. D. Alexander 1979).   
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In indirect altruism there is no expectation of reciprocation from the person who receives 
the benefit but there is from someone else in the society in the future. Indirect reciprocity 
involves reputation and status (Martin A. Nowak, Karl Sigmund 1998) (Martin A. Nowak, Karl 
Sigmund 2005) and so it provides weak support to one-shot anonymous games where reputation 
building is not possible. Nonetheless we find evidence of indirect reciprocity in generous offers 
and punishment of those whose offers are not generous enough in the UG. Vernon Smith 
suggested some people might just be “preprogrammed to engage naturally in acts of positive 
reciprocity” (page 11) (Vernon L. Smith 1998b). But this “preprogramming” does not provide an 
answer for “why” people make the type of other-regarding decisions they make. And finally, 
there is what we call pure altruism (direct altruism), in which people provide benefits to others 
without expectation of any future benefit to themselves. This type of altruism we find in the DG. 
The UG decision might rest on different prosocial emotions from the DG, and if it does, it 
might be direct-reciprocity (reciprocal-altruism as per Trivers), except that here too, the games 
are one-shot and the individuals don’t know and don’t see each other. Yet as there is a direct 
response of the anonymous stranger by either accepting or rejecting the offer, there is a direct 
connection between the two players. The results of the experiments I conducted provide answers 
to these questions in chapter two. Rejection in the UG is also debated as one of two kinds. In one 
sense the rejection might be other-regarding because the rejection is costly to DM2 and it also 
punishes DM1 for sending an unfair offer (D. J-F. DeQuervain et al. 2004;John H. Kagel et al. 
1996;Ernst Fehr, Simon Gachter 2002;Joseph Patrick Henrich et al. 2006). This is sometimes 
referred to as “second-order punishment” (Mizuho Shinada et al. 2004;Karthik Panchanathan, 
Robert Boyd 2004). In the other sense the rejection maybe purely self-regarding and is the result 
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of spite and anger for not receiving what is considered to be fair. The results of the experiment 
presented in chapter two provide evidence toward which group might be right.  
Results of reported laboratory experiments using economic games show that cooperation 
is a primary and integral part of human economic exchanges. Individuals form and maintain 
social bonds using sympathy and empathy and provide benefits to others through helping and 
generosity (Stephanie D. Preston, Frans B. M. de Waal 2002b;Joseph Patrick Henrich et al. 
2005;Adam Smith 1892). Empathy provides the feeling or the imagination of how another 
person feels in response to a particular event and it helps in the understanding and predictions of 
others’ thoughts and intentions; it is a robust process that underpins prosocial as well as 
antisocial behavior (Cameron Anderson, Dacher Keltner 2002;George Ainslie, Nick Haslam 
2002). Generosity is part of a variety of prosocial emotions, such as altruism, reciprocity, 
kindness, fairness, or doing something good (Michael Lewis 2002;Margery Lucas, Laura 
Wagner 2005;Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman 1998;Gary E. Bolton et al. 1998;Frank 
Fincham, Julian Barling 1978).  Empathy reflects on prosocial behaviors that help form 
attachment between people in a society, which often leads to generosity and altruism (Stephanie 
D. Preston, Frans B. M. de Waal 2002b).  
To see if the decision of how much money is sent in the UG is self-regarding or other-
regarding, hormones that are specific to aiding one of the behaviors or the other may be used. 
My experiment used two common hormones that are always present to varying levels in the 
human brain, one of which is known to assist in forming attachments while the other often acting 
in the opposite direction (in animal studies). Resent research on the neural substrates of decision-
making suggests that some decision-making is hormone-dependent. By artificially stimulating 
human subjects with different levels of hormones that they already possess, it is possible to 
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identify if those hormones participate in a particular decision-making and identify brain regions 
affecting decisions. OT is associated with prosocial behavior. OT is associated with prosocial 
behavior. It plays a central role in regulating positive social interactions, such as attachment and 
bonding and affects both social behavior and the mechanisms underlying social behavior (Karen 
L. Bales, C. Sue Carter 2002;R. Landgraf, I. D. Neumann 2004;D. Huber et al. 2005;Kerstin 
Uvnäs-Moberg 1998;Paul J. Zak, Ahlam Fakhar 2006;Paul J. Zak et al. 2005;Paul J. Zak et al. 
2004;C. Sue Carter 1998;Kristin M. Kramer et al. 2005;Alison B. Wismer Fries et al. 
2005;James P. Curley, Eric B. Keverne 2005;Eric B. Keverne, James P. Curley 2004)  
Experiments have shown that manipulating OT levels in the brain influences how 
subjects perceive their environment (Jan Born et al. 2002;Michael Kosfeld et al. 2005b). OT 
seems to permit humans to overcome their anxiety of dealing with strangers in social context 
(Kerstin Uvnäs-Moberg 1998;Kerstin Uvnäs-Moberg, Maria Peterson 2005;Kerstin Uvnäs-
Moberg et al. 2005).  Research shows that OT crosses the blood-brain barrier after intranasal 
administration (Jan Born et al. 2002), providing a simple method for studying its affect on 
humans in a one-shot economic exchange with strangers in lab environment.    
Humans can understand and predict the intentions, beliefs, and desires of others and have 
the capacity to share the feelings of others; this is referred to as empathy (Tania Singer, Ernst 
Fehr 2005;Jim Proctor 2005). Thus the neural processes underlying empathy are of interest in the 
understanding of prosocial behaviors because it is an important factor in one person’s 
recognition of the other’s need, which might render human emotions other-regarding, providing 
the motivational basis for other-regarding behavior (Tania Singer, Ernst Fehr 2005). Offering 
generous help is a component of empathy (Cameron Anderson, Dacher Keltner 2002;Michael 
Lewis 2002;Stephanie D. Preston, Frans B. M. de Waal 2002a). Increased OT levels may induce 
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more empathy (Kerstin Uvnäs-Moberg, Maria Peterson 2005). OT is hypothesized to influence 
subjects to behave more generously in prosocial decision-making.  
AVP has multiple, oftentimes conflicting, roles. AVP may enhance attachment and bonding 
with kin in monogamous males (aiding social recognition of conspecifics in animal experiments) 
(Jennifer N. Ferguson et al. 2002). AVP is also associated with aggressiveness with respect to kin 
protection and reactive aggression (C. Sue Carter 2007). Lack of OT, in some research, dysfunction 
of AVP receptors, have been associated with autism, a frequent human disorder with symptoms of 
socially withdrawn behavior (Miranda M. Lim et al. 2005;C. Sue Carter 2007). AVP is also control 
the resorption of water by the kidneys, regulates the osmotic content of blood, and at high doses 
increases blood pressure (WO Foye et al. 1995). Research also suggests that paradigms in which 
animals have to cope with intense stressor are controlled by both AVP and OT (Mario Engelmann 
et al. 1996). 
In chapter 1 I present a historical background on research with the UG and DG with a 
synthesis of their findings and of the methods they used. Chapters 2 and 3 present the results of my 
two experiments with the UG and DG using OT (chapter 3) and AVP (chapter 3). I provide a brief 
conclusion with summary of findings and recommendations for future research in chapter 4.  
 8  
    
Chapter 1 
Historical Background 
Most neoclassical economic models assume an agent to be maximizing to obtain the 
highest possible well-being (based on the expected utility theory) given available information 
about opportunities with constraints that are both natural and institutional. This model has 
become known as the Homo economicus model. The self-regarding Nash equilibrium predicts 
that in the DG a Homo economicus will behave self-regarding and keep all of the money, $10 in 
this experiment, and send nothing to the an anonymous player-partner if the game is played only 
once and the subjects don’t have the chance to learn about the actions of the other . Thus, if such 
agents receive “$10 in manna from experimental heaven and [are] asked whether they would like 
to share some of it with a stranger,” many do (Colin F. Camerer, Richard H. Thaler 1995).  
However, experiments with small manna, big manna, culturally diverse experiments—
including indigenous people in tribes—face-to-face, blind, double-blind, and in general, 
experiments in any shape or form over the past twenty years provide robust evidence that in one-
shot games people don’t obey the rules of the NE. The question then becomes “why not” and 
“what rule do people obey?” To answer these questions from the perspective of past research, 
this introduction is set out to review literature that spans over two hundred years, starting with 
Darwin and Adam Smith, and ending with the most recent concepts and experimental findings. 
Experimental interference and mistaken concepts played a key role in our developing 
understanding and is highlighted when necessary to advance my thought.   
I chose to use the UG and DG in my experiments because they help us gain more 
knowledge than simply a better understanding of how people play these games. Social 
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infrastructure, business operations, and institutions evolve uniquely to fit the particular culture of 
each specific society. Economic exchanges frequently involve cooperation, reciprocity, and trust 
that enable decision makers to plan, reduce risk, diversify food and income sources, and plan for 
both the short and long term. “Most anthropologists would hardly be surprised by a finding that 
cultural ideas about sharing and cooperation prevent participants in economics experiments from 
acting in their narrowly defined self-interest” (Michael Chibnik 2005) (201-206) but traditional 
economics has excluded hypotheses of other sciences in order to retain its simple and elegant 
models that seemed to work well—before experimental economics was born and pointed out that 
they actually do not work all that well and aren’t nearly as simple as game theory posits.  
Experimental results show that human economic activity is a function of the biological 
and cultural makeup of each individual. These games are often used as parts of economic 
experiments in laboratory settings with US and other Western university students as subjects. In 
recent past, they have been adapted to experiments in other cultures, such as a study in 15 small-
scale societies (Joseph Patrick Henrich et al. 2005) and others in other parts of the world (Hessel 
Oosterbeek et al. 2004;Michael Gurven 2004;Swee-Hoon Chuah et al. 2005;Laura Schechter 
2006).  
While humans behave similarly across some cultures in that they often show other-
regarding behavior, the degree to which they are other-regarding seems to be culture specific. 
Interestingly, in nearly all cultures, there are some individuals who are selfish and leave little for 
DM2 in the UG. However, in nearly all cases, such acts are punished by rejection. In Henrich et 
al.’s study, the Au and Gnau of Papua New Guinea rejected offers even above 50% of the stash. 
Rejecting such generous offers sounds unreasonable but it may have a cultural foundation that is 
not immediately obvious to an outsider. In some societies, like the Au and Gnau villages and 
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throughout Melanesia, accepting gifts of any kind creates a strong obligation to reciprocate at 
some future time. Debts accumulate, and place the receiver in a “subordinate status… As a 
consequence, excessively large gifts, especially unsolicited ones, will frequently be refused” 
(Joseph Patrick Henrich et al. 2005) (page 811). 
Human Brain as an Economic Adaptive Mechanism  
 
It has been suggested that evidence coming from neuroscience, the study of how the brain 
works, “cannot refute economic models because the latter make no assumptions and draw no 
conclusions about the physiology of the brain” (Faruk Gul, Wolfgang Pesendorfer 2005) (page 
2). In their opinion, thus, decision-making of an individual, though is conducted by the brain as 
part of a higher-order processing mechanism, is separate from the mechanisms of how that 
decision is derived. While we certainly cannot separate the actions of the brain from the brain 
itself, what they suggested has some merit, once put differently. Perhaps they should have said 
that some economic models make no assumptions about the environment in which the agents 
make economic exchanges and that they do not make any assumption about the context in which 
those exchanges are made either. The problem has always been that of complexity because 
including all the factors that a real human uses to make a decision would unnecessarily clutter 
economic models and make their use impossible. However, if heuristics do not lead to the same 
result as the heuristics applied by economic models of the same decision-task, we cannot say that 
the models we now have are complete. The trick is to find just how much information we must 
include about the environment and the context such that we can predict the correct economic 
behavior without making the mathematics impossible.    
It is necessary to look at human economic exchanges with a view that includes the 
context in which the decisions are made. This necessitates our understanding of both the external 
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environment in which exchanges take place and also the “internal” environment, the one within 
the brain, because forever changing levels of hormones encourage changing moods and desires 
that are not necessarily explainable by linear relationships, probability theory, unchanging order 
of preferences between goods, and global optimum of all possible options. Physiology is the 
study of all the biological functions of living organisms. Thus, if economics is the study of 
exchanges that living people make, then economics is the study of human physiology as it relates 
to those economic exchanges—this is neuroeconomics. The physiology of the brain cannot be 
disconnected from the functions of the brain any more than the economic exchanges of a person 
can be disconnected from thinking about those actions with the use of his or her brain. The 
human brain is the headquarters of human actions; humans with diseases or damage to their brain 
show us the different economic decisions the brain can make given its internal environment. Let 
me visit the birth of the conflict in economic thought and why economists play games, such as 
the UG and the DG.   
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The Start of Adaptive Decision-Making  
 
Adam Smith mentions sympathy (as “fellow-feeling”), passions and how preferences are 
born in the Theory of Moral Sentiments: 
Neither is it those circumstances only, which create pain or sorrow, that call forth 
our fellow-feeling. Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the 
person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of 
his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator (page 5) (Adam Smith 
1892) 
 
The above passage is often quoted in literature as the leading “passion” statement of 
Smith together a disclaimer like “oh well, it is in the Moral Sentiments, after all.” It is less often 
discussed that Smith refers to passion in his other book too:  
With regard to profusion, the principle which prompts to expence, is the passion 
for present enjoyment; which, though sometimes violent and very difficult to be 
restrained, is in general only momentary and occasional (pages 281-282) (Adam 
Smith 1909).  
 
In this passage, Smith indicates that people sometimes spend more than they intend to; e.g. their 
emotions carry them away from making purely economic decisions. Adam Smith understood that 
humans’ utility functions might have immeasurable, thus non-maximizable, values as well.     
Explorations of Decision-Making through UG and DG   
 
The debate using these games is that human subjects don’t appear to be consistent with 
the game theoretical predictions of choosing the optimum solution from the particular bundle; 
that is they are not choosing their equilibrium solution. Furthermore, there is significant variation 
in the way that they appear to be inconsistent, and that this variation has shown to be age and 
culture specific.       
 13  
    
Choosing an equilibrium bundle is considered to be a distinguishing mental process; 
decision-making based on emotions and gut-feelings were reserved for the naïve and 
underdeveloped. Ironically, it was found that 
younger children behave more selfishly, but gradually behave more fair-mindedly 
[other-regarding] as they grow older, up to age 22 or so… An important exception 
is that about one third of autistic children and adults offer nothing in the UG (E. 
Hill, D. Sally 2004); …[they] behave, ironically, in accordance with the canonical 
model (Joseph Patrick Henrich et al. 2005) (page 799).   
 
As humans grow older, they typically change from self-regarding persons to become 
more other-regarding. Camerer and Thaler describe fairness too as a learnt manner (Colin F. 
Camerer, Richard H. Thaler 1995). Indeed, Murnighan and Saxon found that notions of fairness 
and sharing do not appear until past third grade (J. Murnighan, Keith & Michael S. Saxon 1998). 
In their experiment, the most income maximizing DM2s were kindergartners (J. Keith 
Murnighan, Michael Scott Saxon 1998).  
Even non-human primates are capable of grasping the meaning of economic exchanges; 
non-human primates have been playing ultimatum and dictator games—albeit their researchers 
did not explicitly state such claim1.   
                                                 
1 Brosnan, de Waal, and many others, tested for emotions and reasoning in non-human primates (Sarah F. Brosnan, 
Frans B. M. de Waal 2003;Sarah F. Brosnan, Frans B. M. de Waal 2004b;Sarah F. Brosnan, Frans B. M. de Waal 
2002;Sarah F. Brosnan, Frans B. M. de Waal 2004c;Sarah F. Brosnan, Frans B. M. de Waal 2000;Sarah F. Brosnan, 
Frans B. M. de Waal 2004a;H Smith et al. 1998;Frans B. M. de Waal 1997). In their test of Capuchin monkey 
cooperation, Bosnan et al. formulated an experiment that reveals interesting similarity to humans playing UG and 
DG. They set up pairs of Capuchin monkeys in two cages separated by a small fence and trained them to trade work 
for food. Two see-through bowls were provided outside these cages. Sometimes they were filled with food for one 
Capuchin, sometimes for the other one, or for both.  Brosnan’s team attached weights to the levers so that 
cooperative pull was necessary; e.g., if the bowl for one Capuchin was empty but the bowl was filled for the other, 
the one with empty bowl had to help pull, else neither of them got any food—this is a similar composition to the 
UG. Not helping to pull equals rejection and both stay hungry. In particular, Brosnan and de Waal found that 
Capuchins would help pull more often in the cooperation trials if in the previous trial cooperation was achieved. In 
other words, experience with the playmate from previous social interactions (e.g. reputation) helped in the decision-
making if a Capuchin was worthy of a helping pull to give her food. The expectation of reciprocity is strong in non-
human primates.  
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Vernon Smith has studied market exchanges in his laboratory and suggested that people 
have both cooperative and non-cooperative skills and they use them according to the appropriate 
occasions (Vernon L. Smith 1998b;Vernon L. Smith 2003). He also suggested that humans use 
non-cooperative (self-regarding) methods when dealing in the impersonal markets, while they 
use the more cooperative (other-regarding) means when dealing with family, friends, and 
neighbors—a somewhat similar statement to calculative trust of Oliver Williamson a few years 
earlier (Oliver E. Williamson 1993).  
Sometimes a self-regarding agent may choose to pretend to be other-regarding in order to 
achieve a particular goal (Colin F.Camerer, Ernst Fehr 2006a), which complicates the 
deciphering of what experimental subjects actually really think when they make their decisions. 
It is not too difficult to envision that the use of modern technology, such as functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), may be used to see who is faking and who is not based on activation 
of the particular brain region. Perhaps “faking” is a cultural norm that all people use in economic 
exchanges. If so, one would expect a cultural “standard” of faking and most people would be 
found to fake at about the same level2.      
Reciprocity – The Nice Guys  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Brosnan and de Waal found the rate of acceptance of Capuchins having to give a helping hand to be 39% (Sarah F. 
Brosnan, Frans B. M. de Waal 2000), somewhat lower than the acceptance rate of human-sharing in UG (close to 
100% in the UG). In the same experiment, Brosnan and de Waal found that Capuchins share their food in what they 
called “facilitated taking,” in which when only one Capuchin received food from the cooperative pull, she moved 
close to the separating fence, let food pieces fall to the floor, and allowed the other Capuchin to reach over and take 
it through the fence. This I find similar to the DG, in which DM1 receives all the money (food in the case of the 
Capuchin) and may decide to share some with someone in the room (this means giving in DG and allowing to take 
in Capuchin experiments). Note, however, that in the case of the Capuchins, each participating female knew each 
other whereas the experiments with humans are usually blind, multi-gender, and typically one-shot.   
2 Most studies that published their results in the evaluation whether the perception of fairness is enough report that, 
indeed, the perceived fairness payment (when the DM2 is uninformed of the true value of the money DM1 has to 
split), on average, is below the informed payment and the offer that is perceived to be fair is accepted. But no study 
to this date analyzed whether everyone fakes fairness when the opportunity arises or if only some of the people do. 
See (Colin F. Camerer, Richard H. Thaler 1995;Michael Mitzkewitz, Rosemarie Nagel 1993;John H. Kagel et al. 
1996;Rachel T. A. Croson 1996) for further details. 
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Adam Smith’s statements about emotional decision-making were overlooked for many 
years. In neoclassical economic theories human behavior was simplified and reduced to 
contractual interactions between agents that traded goods based on highest probability, lowest 
cost, and rigid orderability of preferences. The transition back toward Adam Smith’s emotional 
agent started with Dawkins, Axelrod, and Trivers in the mid to late 70’s.    
Richard Dawkins titled chapter 12 of his book “Nice Guys Finish First,” (Richard 
Dawkins 1976) (1999 edition) which was his translation of the turn of events brought to light by 
Robert Axelrod in three competitions for a “best” Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game solution in 
evolutionary terms—meaning the one that provided the most stable solution (Robert Axelrod, 
William D. Hamilton 1981;Robert Axelrod, Douglas Dion 1988). The PD game is simple; two 
computer “characters” (paired subjects equivalent) receive two cards: “cooperate” and “defect.” 
Four combinations exist: either both cooperate, both defect, or one cooperates and the other 
defects with an asymmetrical payoff structure.  Dawkins discusses this game from an 
evolutionary perspective and quoted American biologist Garrett Hardin who said “nice guys 
finish last” in order to emphasize what may have been called “selfish genery” that is befit to be a 
member of the classical economics theories of self-regarding actors. In Darwinian sense, “a nice 
guy is an individual that assists other members of its species, at its own expense, to pass their 
genes on to the next generation. Nice guys, then, seem bound to decrease in numbers: niceness 
dies a Darwinian death” (Dawkins, page 10). The classical economic theory’s self-regarding 
maximizing individuals thus suit the Darwinian evolutionary image. But in Axelrod’s 
competition, actually the “nice guy” finished first!   
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Dawkins explains why this “nice guy” could survive evolution (in contrast of the 
“Darwinian death”), which conceptualizes what is to have become the UG. He introduces 
Grudgers, a group within a type of bird, that helped each other in an altruistic way, but  
refused to help—bore a grudge against—individuals that had previously refused 
to help them. Grudgers came to dominate the population because they passed on 
more genes to future generations than either Suckers (who helped others 
indiscriminately, and were exploited) or Cheats (who tried to exploit everybody 
and ended up doing each other down). The story of Grudgers illustrates an 
important general principle, which Robert Trivers called ‘reciprocal altruism’ 
(Dawkins, page 202).  
 
Reciprocal altruism is discussed in economics but has been assumed to only be 
participant in kin groups; hence it was troubling to think that people acted altruistically in the UG 
with non-kin. However, the Grudgers tell us a different story about altruism; they tell us that the 
Grudgers ended up dominating the population. What this means is that behaving altruistically 
can change the population from cheaters and defeaters into cooperators within a few generations. 
Camerer et al. (Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr 2006) and Fehr et al. (Ernst Fehr et al. 2000) 
introduce concepts that are akin to this population domination by the “nice guys.” These 
concepts suggest that individuals with sharing motive can turn individuals with non-sharing 
motive into sharing types. The tools are the proper identifications and use of “strategic 
complements” and “strategic substitutes,” albeit with one caveat: in Camerer et al., the 
transformation is strategic and temporary, whereas in the Grudgers, it becomes genetic and 
permanent, pending genetic mutations on the long run.  
At this point little can be said about possible methods of changing an entire population 
generation toward becoming more sharing types, particularly if we use our abilities to put on a 
new face as the environment necessitates it. Changing to become other-regarding, in the case of 
strategic complementarity, is not only temporary but also a “fake.” This should present a serious 
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problem in our understanding of human behavior because we cannot know for sure when the 
subjects play genuine and when opportunistic or fake. However, a large share of strong 
reciprocators in the population can be part of an evolutionarily stable situation, suggesting that 
those who “fake it” might be forced to convert (Robert. Boyd et al. 2003;R. Sethi, E. 
Somanathan 2003;Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis 2006). Some of the questions I would like to 
ask are as follows: What are the modifiable elements that change the behavior of the people? 
Does what is prevalent today in our society (as far as experiments can tell) provide an 
evolutionary stable system (ESS)? For example, which provides ESS: genuine fairness or faking 
fairness or the mixture of the two? What are the underlying biological functions that drive us 
toward or away from an ESS? Can we modify these biological functions without destroying 
ESS?      
Economic decision-making doesn’t happen in a vacuum. To see the decision-making 
environment, it is helpful to first look at what it takes to program economic decision-making into 
computers that mimic human decision-making in a risky environment. When Axelrod set up the 
model for the evolution of human cooperation, he listed several requirements for the simulation 
steps, of which two are described here: (1) specification of an environment in which the PD can 
be operated, and (2) specification of the genetics (history), including the way in which 
information on the emulated chromosome is translated into a strategy for the simulated 
individual (Robert Axelrod 1981). Axelrod wanted to develop a PD game that was based on 
survival mechanisms, not unlike that of Dawkins’ theories on the gene (Richard Dawkins 1976). 
Axelrod also showed that increasing the number of players increases the difficulty of 
maintaining cooperation, and that having one player defect after a number of cooperating 
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periods, increases the likelihood of the population reaching a certain threshold at which defection 
dominates.  
The UG and DG 
The UG was introduced in 1963, (L. E. Fouraker, S. Siegel 1963), and first used as part 
of an economic experiment by Güth et al. to analyze bargaining behavior (Werner Güth et al. 
1982). Güth and his team described that by game theory, the UG is considered to be a game of 
one person on each end where each person is playing a game alone. But this assessment is 
incorrect because “all that player i has to do is to make a choice which is good for himself” (page 
368), and the same for player j. However, if player i chooses his best maximizing solution and 
passes little or nothing to player j, in the UG player j has veto rights. If j is unsatisfied with the 
share of the pie, he can reject the deal, thereby cancelling the deal for player i as well; they both 
end up empty handed. Thus the two players are playing dependently on one another.    
Güth found that players gave more money to stranger than would have been predicted by 
to game theory. Even more surprisingly, the receiving players used their veto rights even when 
some money was given to them. In one experiment players played both roles, the role of the 
sender and the receiver. Güth compared the amount of what each player maximally offered as 
DM1 and what the same player would minimally have accepted as DM2. The inconsistency, 
Güth thought, was attributed to the players’ knowledge that they will play both roles. “Knowing 
to be player1 in one game and player2 in another game might have caused some subjects to care 
for a fair bargaining result” (380).  
With Axelrod and Güth’s publications showing that something other than monetary 
utility-maximization was driving economic decision-making in the laboratory, many experiments 
commenced; some with mistaken concepts that gave confused results and were based on 
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unsound theoretical principles. Binmore et al. set out to test this “anomalous” economic 
decision-making of the players in one-shot UG. They designed the experiment such that each 
person played both DM1 and DM2 roles repeatedly against the same individual (K. Binmore et 
al. 1985). What they found was identical to what Güth et al found in 1982 and they warned about 
the validity of Güth’s statement against the predictive power of game theory in the one-shot 
games. In proof that Güth’s comment was inappropriate, they played what they called one-shot 
games, which had two stages. In stage one the players played a standard UG with 100 pence 
(monetary unit) and divided it in any way. In the second stage, the same two subjects (in 
anonymity) were paired but with only 25 pence and DM2 made the first offer. Only the opening 
offer of DM2 was recorded and compared with the first stage game. Thus what Binmore et al., 
played were sequentially repeated games with learning effects rather than one-shot games. 
Neelin et al., in repeating Binmore’s experiment with three-shot games, found that the results of 
the two-shot games did not hold in three-shot games (Janet Neelin et al. 1988).   
Some experiments that claimed to prove that human make their decisions based on the 
expected utility theory’s axioms placed the experiment itself on the basis of the thenceforth 
assumed utility theory, and set out to look for the very thing it assumed. A classic example of 
this is Rubistein’s UG experiment in 1982 (Ariel Rubistein 1982). This experiment he called an 
“ultimatum-type” game between two players. In the first step, DM1 proposes and if DM2 accepts 
the game ends with the payout. If DM2 does not accept, he may make an offer and the game goes 
on for several rounds, until DM2 accepts. The assumption is that both parties behave according 
the expected utility theory and that all its axioms are met. Clearly such bargaining shares little 
with one-shot games in which cooperation between anonymous strangers is the object of study. 
Another critical unrealistic assumption is that all players have complete information about the 
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preferences of others. The game Rubinstein used was a sequential centipede game with full 
knowledge at each nod of the opponent’s step. Thaler critiqued by writing “when a Recipient 
declines a positive offer, he signals that his utility function has non-monetary arguments” 
(Richard H. Thaler 1988) (197).  
Gneezy et al. had a very similar experiment to Rubistein in1982. They experimented with 
what they called a “reverse ultimatum game” with a variety of conditions, such as deadlines and 
the number of responders participating, in repeated games of 25 (Uri Gneezy et al. 2003). They 
hypothesized that the addition of a deadline would shift the sub-game perfect equilibrium 
prediction from one extreme to the other in terms of which bargainer is predicted to gain all but a 
fraction of the available money, which is did, showing that the person with the bargaining 
control power takes home more. In their game, if DM2 rejected the offer, DM1 was allowed to 
make another offer. They called the game a “reverse” ultimatum game because it was DM1 
doing the bargaining until DM2 accepted. However, similarly to Rubinstein in 1982, Gneezy et 
al. also applied a centipede game, but in which update was actual rather than Bayesian; each 
player received specific answer rather than a risky social cue. Gneezy et al., found significant 
learning effects over the 25 game-periods and that no matter which way the game was set up, the 
majority of the proposers still offered “fair” amounts rather than the SGPNE.   
Hoffman and Spitzer, while testing the Coase Theorem in two- and three-person bargains, 
ended up drawing a conclusion for one-shot games, like UG and DG, but the game had complex 
rules, and there was this ever-present arbitrator to implement the decision (Elizabeth Hoffman, 
Matthew L. Spitzer 1982).  Harrison suggested that the reason why DM2s reject offers is that the 
opportunity cost of “misbehavior” in these experiments is small and thus the anomalies may not 
be anomalies at all but reflect a “theoretically consistent behavior under conditions where 
 21  
    
misbehavior is virtually costless”(Glenn W. Harrison 1992)  (page 1426). However, so long as 
the stakes are small for both gain and loss, if the players find any kind of behavior costless, then 
I would think that the reverse is also true: there cannot be any benefits to being upset about not 
receiving enough share of the pie. The showing of “feeling insulted” by rejecting the offer, 
however small the offer may be, shows that DM2s receive some non-monetary utility large 
enough.  
The influence of stake-size has been heavily investigated. Dickinson suggested that 
bargainers take advantage of information asymmetries (David L. Dickinson 2000). He 
hypothesized that as the size of the pie gets arbitrarily large, DM2s will be less likely to reject a 
smaller offer since the monetary penalty for doing so grows increasingly large. He set up an 
experiment to test information asymmetry in action and the kindness theory (kindness theory is a 
function Rabin developed that he called “kindness function,” which measures how kind one 
player is to another (Matthew Rabin 1993)). Dickinson did so by changing the size of the 
available stash (from $1 to $15) and by telling only DM1 what DM2 did in the previous round 
and he played repeated games for five rounds but with different partners in each round. DM1s 
were given on “a piece of paper what [DM2] was offered, what the pie size was, and they were 
also told whether or not [DM2] accepted or rejected the offer” (David L. Dickinson 2000). 
Furthermore, he was comparing if stake-size changed the rejection percentage. He reports his 
results as having found statistically significant means but the significance powers are rather mild 
(p-range 0.08 to 0.43, with one exception, the $7 stash was significantly different at p = 0.02 – 
page 165). However, in my view, the DM1’s offer was not a response for the changing size of 
the pie but for the history of previous response by DM2, in other words, Dickinson tested the 
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effect of reputation on UG transactions; he replaced ambiguity with a known probability 
distribution. Yet even then, his results were rather mild.   
Cameron ran a field experiment in Indonesia in 1994 in which she raised the stakes to 
represent substantial earnings (for example, she offered $100 stake where the per capita gross 
domestic product was US$670) and she found that stake size had no effect on the percentage of 
money DM1 sent to DM2, or the percent that DM2 rejected; as found Carpenter et al., in their 
experiment where they tested both the UG and the DG (Jeffrey Carpenter et al. 2005;Lisa A. 
Cameron 1999). However, Cameron found that in imaginary (hypothetical) games, DM2s were 
much more likely to reject than in real games (Lisa A. Cameron 1999). 
Eckel and Grossman recruited two groups of players: volunteer subjects in the usual way 
and pseudo-volunteer subjects (class-time students), all participating in a DG experiment with a 
charity as the recipient (Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman 2000). The experiment was 
meant to test for social signal differences between volunteers and pseudo-volunteers in the 
typical economic exchange scenario using DG. The unintended interference was provided by the 
subjects being asked if they would be willing to participate “voluntarily” in a game (asked in 
class by the authors, who were professors in these classes) – henceforth called the “pseudo 
volunteers,” the charity that was chosen by the authors (professor’s favorite?), and by the 
pseudo-volunteers’ knowledge that they have the “option” to donate to the professor’s charity 
(Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman 2000). As there is no risk or ambiguity involved in 
offering a donation to a charity, no applicable social signal was exchanged, only personal 
preference, and because the professor’s image was hovering in the pseudo-volunteers mind when 
making their decisions, they showed skewed preference toward “sharing”. Eckel and Grossman 
thus found that volunteer subjects (those with no connection to the class, and hence, a grade from 
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the faculty) were significantly more likely to offer zero to the charity than pseudo-volunteers and 
that almost 29% of the pseudo-volunteer gave everything to the charity, while only 5% of the 
true volunteers did.  
Even as late as 2005, we still find misunderstandings about human nature and human 
behavior in economic experiments. For example, Bardsley noted that people don’t seem to make 
anonymous donations to strangers and decided to set up an experiment to test whether DG truly 
measure social preferences or if they measure something else (Nicholas Bardsley 2005). He 
hypothesized that if giving money was equivalent to taking money (as it is true in mathematics), 
then the game reflected true social preference. He wanted to measure the difference between 
what players would offer to give and what they would take. However, he did not find any 
difference because subjects, knowing that in one experiment they will give and in the other take, 
did not offer much in the first place in the giving part. Furthermore, in one version of the game 
the subjects had to choose between giving some positive amounts (from £0 - £4) or take £2 from 
the show-up fee earned by the opposing players—and results suggest that many did take but not 
all. In order to get stronger results, he simulated 10,000 experiments and using nonparametric 
techniques, he was able then top reject the null hypothesis at 5% level. Hence, what Bardsley 
actually tested was a player taking the endowment from one player (negative) versus a player 
giving something from his endowment by choice (positive) to the other.  
However, giving is an altruistic act while taking is a punishing act. Adding and 
subtracting in human terms have strikingly different utilities associated with them; one provides 
reward and the other punishes in terms of endowment. Thaler showed that an item of endowed 
value is greater than the value of the same item not yet owned (R. Thaler 1980).  
My final example of mistaken views is Rustichini’s comment, who suggests that  
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the task of an economist is to establish useful predictions on which human 
behavior will follow given certain incentives, preferences, and feasibility 
constraints. This set of parameters, that is available to the economist analyzing the 
situation, defines the input, and the behavior is the output (Aldo Rustichini 2005) 
(page 203).  
 
Rustichini is missing the most important element in the definition of the input and the 
output. Where is the giant processing machine, the brain? Rustichini suggests that inputs are 
given by external conditions (incentives and constraints) and internal ones (preferences) that 
combined provide the variables for processing, of which the output becomes the human 
behavior.  Put differently, if Rustichini’s comments were true, similarly to any factory machinery 
or computer used as processors, so long as the inputs are the same, one would predictably always 
get the same output. This suggests that the processor does not add additional input variables, 
which is certainly true in the case of computers. However, each person has a very unique 
processor sitting atop his or her neck and each of these processors provides additional inputs 
(hormones) into the model based on a mixture of physiological constraints. In fact, this is 
precisely what laboratory experiments with economic games are trying to capture.  
The researchers provide the same instructions and the same money to each participant—
thus the controllable external variables are the same. Not only do experimenters want to see the 
end result (the outcome) of how much money is exchanging hands, but the behavioral constraints 
as well by analyzing blood hormonal levels or imaging the brain at the time of decision-making 
or adding neuropeptides to analyze how modified internal environment of the individual affects 
how much money is exchanging hands. In the case of humans, it is the behavior and not the input 
that modifies the output.  If the brain did not provide input, how would adding neuropeptides 
modify the outcome? Yet adding neuropeptides does modify the outcome! See a great study 
about nasally administering OT into human subjects and what that does to their behavior in terms 
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of modifying the output they offer (Michael Kosfeld et al. 2005a) and also see the next chapter in 
which I use OT to induce a more generous behavior in the UG.  
Great Experiments  
There have been some truly ingenious experiments as well as there were lots of 
oppositions to the games and experimenting techniques. Vernon Smith suggested that “subjects 
experience the choices of others and then choose based on what they have learned to accept” 
(Vernon L. Smith 1998b) (page 110; emphasis added). But not all experiments offer the chance 
of experiencing the decisions of others. In particular, experiments that want to learn the influence 
of hormones do not provide feedback because it would contaminate the results by measuring 
reactive emotions rather than the affect of the neuropeptide itself. Smith argued that the 
experimental procedures themselves constitute unintended contaminants. He further suggested 
that 
the idea that one should randomize effects that are not controlled comes from 
biology, where you randomize treatments among plots of land to prevent 
differences in soil quality from being attributed accidentally to the treatments. But 
human subjects are not plots of land, and the method of assignment may not have 
a neutral effect on behavior… results call into question the interpretation of data 
from the large literature in bilateral bargaining that is characterized by a first-
mover, or other asymmetric advantage, randomly assigned… the question is 
whether inducing fair behavior is the appropriate way to frame the test of a 
bargaining theory that assumes self-interested agents whose interests conflict, as 
with management and labor. Now, if one were to replicate all the asymmetric 
bargaining experiments, assigning privileged rights only to those who earned 
them, and still observe fair outcomes, then this would call into question the 
relevance of the theory” (Vernon L. Smith 1998a) (112-113).  
 
Smith makes a good point. As the reader will see in chapter 3, I describe such possible 
contamination by randomizing the order in which the games were played. It is well documented 
that some games, the trust game in particular, makes the subjects release OT (Paul J. Zak et al. 
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2004). Such OT release can override the effects of other hormones—in this case AVP—
cancelling out the desired effect.    
Schotter et al. designed an experiment to test what Smith suggested: mimic a “true” 
market under survival pressures and see if agents still defy the theory (Andrew Schotter et al. 
1996). His team introduced property rights in two-stage-survival UG and DG, in which 
proposers were competing with each other in offering higher amounts to the same one responder. 
Whoever was able to have his offer accepted, entered stage two as “property right owner.” As 
property owners, the money they kept for themselves in the second game (second stage) was 
higher; “demand behavior changes substantially as we move from the one-stage to the two-stage 
experiments” and DM2s rejected less often the smaller amounts offered in the second stage 
(Schotter et al., 1996, page 44).   
To address the first-mover-advantage question, Weber et al. set up an experiment to see if 
first movers would demand different dollar amount from when the same players moved second 
(Roberto A Weber et al. 2004). They found that minimal acceptable offers (MinAccept) of 
DM2s became lower when they knew that they were going to move second, and were higher 
when they knew that they were first-movers. They suggested that the timing result points to an 
interpretation on fairness that is incomplete. If only distaste for unfairness drives the response of 
DM2, their minimum acceptable offer amount should not change based on the knowledge of who 
moves first. Within the fairness framework, the answer they suggest is that a low offer appears to 
be fairer when a person is DM1 and moves first than when that same player is DM2 and moves 
second. But this answer suggests that fairness is based on who has access to exercise advantage 
(Weber, page 40). 
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Kahneman et al. wanted to get a better understanding of how consumers react to the 
model of profit-seeking firms by considering the newly discovered preferences that people have 
for being treated fairly (Daniel Kahneman et al. 1986). They set up an experiment in which two 
individuals played the DG. The dictator was called “fair,” if he offered half of the play-money or 
“unfair” if he took more than half. A third individual then had to choose with whom she would 
split a certain dollar amount (knowing the history of previous exchanges). Would she split a 
larger amount with an unfair player or a smaller amount with a fair player? The majority of the 
third players chose to split the smaller amount in order to share with the fair player, albeit at a 
cost to themselves.  
Aumann suggested that even though people reject in UG because they are insulted, the 
models still consider this insult exogenous (Robert J. Aumann 1986). He recalled Axelrod et al.’s 
experiment with the PD game and how it is usually “a crazy type, that wins out – takes over the 
game, so to speak… there is only one crazy type, who always plays tit-for-tat, no matter what the 
other player does; and it turns out that the rational type must imitate the crazy type, he must also 
play tit-for-tat.” Axelrod’s team already had a theory why crazy types win (Robert Axelrod, 
William D. Hamilton 1981;Robert Axelrod 1981;Robert Axelrod, Douglas Dion 1988). But new 
theories have emerged providing different theories about who these “crazy types” are and why 
they win. Fehr and Tyran (Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran 2005), and Camerer and Fehr (Colin F. 
Camerer, Ernst Fehr 2006) suggested that “strategic complementarity”3 is participating in these 
games, which means that it takes only a small number of individuals to play other-regarding 
before that may lead to large deviations from aggregate predictions of NE models, whereas under 
                                                 
3 “I do as you do” 
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strategic substitutability4 the opposite is true, a minority of self-regarding agents may suffice to 
generate aggregate outcomes consistent with the predictions of NE game-theoretical models.    
The process of why Aumann’s “crazy types win” is detailed by Camerer and Fehr as 
follows: what happens if a strong reciprocator faces a self-regarding player and both players 
know each other’s preferences? [Note: there is a bit of a problem here with “knowing” the other 
person’s preferences but I will let it go at this time for the sake of making a point]. In a 
simultaneous game, the existence of the self-regarding player will induce the reciprocator to 
behave non-cooperatively as well. If the exchange is structured sequentially, however, with the 
self-regarding player starting first, an exchange will take place because the self-regarding player 
knows that the reciprocating player will only respond to a reasonable offer (Colin F.Camerer, 
Ernst Fehr 2006b) (page 47).  
Preferences, Beliefs, and Environmental Factors 
I would like to return to my note about knowing the preferences of others above in 
Camerer’s and Fehr’s explanation. Obviously they placed the framework of the “old” Homo 
economicus model as grounds for explaining a phenomenon that otherwise has no known answer 
(so far) in this literature review—the reader may suggest that telepathy may exists under these 
circumstance. Assume for a moment that you, the reader of this article, and I suddenly find 
ourselves engaged in playing a game of DG or UG, anonymously. Would I, under any 
circumstances, know your preferences without actually knowing you? Would you know mine? 
Certainly, I may postulate that given that you are reading my article, you and I share at least one 
thing in common: we both know what this article is about; this gives you some shared history of 
me. This may allow us to form beliefs about one another’s expectation but those are just beliefs 
                                                 
4 “if you go right I go left” 
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(some based on reputation) and not actual knowledge of preferences. In the lab where 
experiments are conducted, hundreds of students converge from the same university in a room to 
play the games. Obviously they share some beliefs—otherwise they would not be students in the 
same institution. In general every university lab experiment is biased by the homogeneity of the 
population from which a group of convenience is selected for experiments. Random selection 
must be ignored and the subjects are not independent because they all share at least two systemic 
bias: 1) same university and 2) they all are volunteers, which by definition distinguishes them 
from those who don’t volunteer. However, as these errors are systemic across the board in all 
experiments, perhaps we all start from a plateau that is different from a study of true independent 
observations but since all laboratory experiments have them, this systemic error can be ignored.   
“Cultural traits like values, ambitions, and lifestyles influence economic behavior and 
thereby economic conditions [see on this subject (Paul J. Zak, Stephen Knack 2001)]. Economic 
conditions exert selective pressure on the cultural traits” (Selten, page 90). “Mechanisms of 
cultural evolution are shaped by biological evolution and competitive processes involve learning 
and imitation” (Selten, pages 92, 101). Thus Selten also noticed the mimicking behavior 
necessary for successful societies. Henrich and team found in their experiments in 15 small-scale 
societies that there were distinct group-differences in notions of fairness (Joseph Patrick Henrich 
et al. 2005). They also found that the level of market integration of a society influences 
differences in notions of fairness and punishment. They found that the selfishness axiom 
accurately predicts DM2 behavior in some societies but not university students in lab 
experiment. They also found that few or none of the subjects in these small-scale societies 
offered zero in DG. They further write that “cultural evolution and its products have undoubtedly 
influenced the human genotype… The relationship between culture-gene coevolutionary theory 
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and the preferences, beliefs, and constraints approach is straightforward, although rarely 
illuminated” (Henrich, page 812).  
Fairness in One-Shot Blinded Games? 
The question of whether fairness drives the unexpected human behavior in UG was asked 
by many. Fairness is defined as sacrificing self-gains “to change the distribution of material 
outcomes among others, sometimes rewarding those who act prosocially and punishing those 
who do not” (Joseph Patrick Henrich et al. 2005) (page 797). Forsythe et al. tested if the fairness 
hypothesis can explain the result of Güth’s experiment (Robert Forsythe et al. 1994b;Robert 
Forsythe et al. 1994a). They hypothesized that if the results of the UG and the DG are the same, 
fairness is the explanation. However, as they did not find this to be the case, they concluded that 
fairness can only be one factor that determines the money offered by DM1 in UG. Nowak et al. 
developed an evolutionary approach to the UG (M. A. Nowak et al. 2000). They suggested that 
fairness will evolve if DM1 can obtain some information on what deals DM2 has accepted in the 
past, similarly to the hypothesis of Dickinson (David L. Dickinson 2000). They believed that the 
evolution of fairness, similarly to the evolution of cooperation, is linked to reputation and is 
driven by a mechanism that is similar to genetic evolutionary forces. Like Dawkins’ Grudgers, 
future generations of individuals leave their offspring in proportion to their “total payoff,” which 
in this case is “success rate,” and each new generation only deals with those who have been 
accepted by DM2s in previous encounters. This process can readily lead to the evolution of 
fairness in repeated games where reputation matters. Why fairness evolves without explicit 
reputation, as is the case in one-shot blinded games, remains to be solved by those experiments 
that can measure emotional responses more directly, such as the two experiments that follow this 
chapter.  
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The dictator game by its nature removes incentives for strategic behavior. The 
assumption is that if players still act fairly in DGs, they must have a taste for fairness, which was 
introduced earlier as sacrificing self-gains in order to change the distribution of material 
outcomes among others to benefit those who act prosocially and punish those who do not 
(Michael P. Haselhuhn, Barbara A. Mellers 2005). Haselhuhn and Mellers modified the UG and 
DG such that DM1s are also asked to imagine the pleasure they would feel with each possible 
payoff—payments were paid according to the actual games and not based on the imagined 
possible payoffs. They were told to rank-order their preferences over all possible offers, and to 
draw inferences about the emotions DM2 might feel.  Their statistics shows that 25% of DM1s 
thought they did not derive pleasure from fairness, 65% some pleasure, and 10% significant 
pleasure (Haselhuhn). They also found that preference-orders differed from pleasure-orders. 
Most DM1s made fair offers in the UG, but cooperation appeared to be strategic rather than 
emotional. However, there were 10% of DM1s who derived greater pleasure from fair payoffs 
than from larger payoffs (Haselhuhn, page 29). In the DG, 55% of dictators derived no pleasure 
from fairness, and 15% felt significant pleasure from fairness. Those dictators who received 
pleasure from fairness, tended to make fair offers even when they had no strategic reason to do 
so.  
Saad and Gill (Gad Saad, Tripat Gill 2001) and Eckel and Grossman (Catherine C. Eckel, 
Philip J. Grossman 1996) found that in the UG, female allocators were more concerned about 
fairness when making offers than males, while males made more generous offers when pitted 
against a female than a male. White females made equal offers independently of the sex of the 
recipient. They also suggested an evolutionary explanation for fairness; “male allocators are 
altruistic towards female recipients and competitive with male recipients is construed as a 
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manifestation of social rules, which evolve from the male predisposition to use resources for 
attracting mates” (Saad and Gill, page 171). Takahashi observed that there was a negative 
correlation between interpersonal trust and social stress-induced cortisol elevation in DM2s in 
UG under stress, indicating that subjects with high levels of interpersonal trust showed reduced 
social stress (Taiki Takahashi 2005). “Collectively, interpersonal trust might possibly enhance 
social cooperation via better social memory due to lowered acute social stress actions during a 
face-to-face social interaction, which would result in high levels of an economic growth” (Taiki 
Takahashi 2005) (page 4).  
Environmental Cues: Cultural Heuristics 
I have frequently mentioned throughout this essay that players have beliefs rather than 
actual updates of the preferences of others. One clever experiment calls attention to cues that 
hang in the general environment without even our conscience observation. Blythe et al. set up an 
experiment that shows just how such social cues may enter into comprehension without the 
players’ knowledge (Philip W. Blythe et al. 1999). Their goal was the opposite of what one may 
expect; they wanted to see if complex social cues can tell the story about the intentions of the 
individuals while playing certain games. The games were played by volunteers on the computer 
with imaginary little creatures. On screen two bugs: one blue and the other red. Each player 
played 6 types of games: red bug plays with blue bug, red bug courts blue bug, blue bug acts 
being courted, blue bug courts red bug and red acts courted, red bug pursues blue bug who is 
trying to evade, the same with bug color change, and lastly the two bugs are fighting. In each of 
these games, the human volunteer controlling the specific bug is given a list of “to do’s” but 
otherwise “acts out” the feeling according to his or her best interpretation of what “courting” or 
“fighting” means. For example, to court, the bug “owner” volunteer was told to move the bug to 
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court the other bug by interacting with it in any way that it might find interesting, exciting, or 
enticing. The owner of the courted bug was instructed to move the bug to show interest or 
disinterest, and to elicit further displays in any way desired (page 266).   
Since the bugs were computer images, their movements could easily be digitized and 
recorded on a time-series model 3D graph—the bugs themselves were reduced to directionless 
dots. Blythe et al. averaged the motion images of the many trials and displayed the aggregate 
image of the six motion types. Next they invited new volunteers who were not familiar with the 
game and replayed in front of them only the time-correct motion graphs of dots (no bugs were 
seen). The job of the volunteers was to identify which type of the six the particular bug-
aggregate-motions they were looking at. The uninitiated were able to predict the motion-intents 
of the bug on the screen with about 50% accuracy based on the graphs alone—random guessing 
is expected to be correct 18% of the time, so 50% is well above randomness. When Blyth’s team 
removed one of the two bugs and showed, again, to uninitiated players, but this time the bug-
aggregate-motions of only one of the two bugs, the recognition of the motion was reduced to 
approximately 30% but still did not disappear.  
What this experiment clearly demonstrates is that social cues “in the air” can 
continuously reaffirm or modify a person’s belief in the type of environment. In the laboratory, 
there is plenty of opportunity for receiving such social cues. One of them, I already mentioned, is 
that the volunteers come from the same institution. Another is that as they come for the 
experiments, they line up to provide their student identifications; sometimes the line is long and 
there is ample opportunity to look and feel who is in the crowd. Although once the UG or DG 
starts in the lab, the volunteers do not specifically know whom they play with, they certainly 
know the “average makeup” of the people in the room. They can, thus, estimate if they are in an 
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environment where acting according to the rules of strategic complementarity or strategic 
substitutability would offer the highest payoff.  
Reciprocity can be based on experience from the past by having repeated interaction but 
they can “also be based on the knowledge that the members of the interacting group are ‘alike’” 
(Ernst Fehr, Bettina Rockenbach 2004). In an experiment by Gachter and Thoni, subjects were 
ranked with respect to their contribution in a one-shot PG game and then sorted into groups of 
individuals with similar ranks (S. Gachter, C. Thoni 2005). Cooperation in the “alike” groups of 
like-minded people was found to be significantly higher than in random group composition—
supporting significantly that lab environment, which is made up of individuals that are members 
of an “alike” group, might provide economic choices that reflect the norms of that “in-group.”   
Framing and Machs 
Hoffman et al. conducted several interesting experiments testing fairness with a variety of 
framing approaches. In their 1996 experiment, using DG, they tested the theory that framing 
might have a lot to do with the appearance of fairness in the game (Elizabeth Hoffman et al. 
1996). In most cases at that time, the experiments were conducted under observation, rather than 
blindly from everyone, including the experimenters. They conducted their experiment double-
blind and requested that the dictators place their offer to the recipient into an envelope, place the 
envelope in a box, from which the experimenters took them, counted the money and passed them 
on to the recipients. They found that “there was a pronounced tendency for those leaving no 
money to seal their envelope, and for those leaving positive amounts of money to not seal their 
envelopes.” They concluded that other-regarding behavior varies with context based on 
opportunity costs (Elizabeth Hoffman et al. 1996). With respect to framing, they suggested that 
subjects bring their ongoing experience of the world with them into the laboratory, and the 
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instructional language used can associate a subject’s decision with past experience. For example, 
“suggesting that the task is to ‘divide’ the $10 may imply that the objective is to share the money 
with someone, who, though anonymous, is socially relatively near to the decision-maker” 
(Hoffman, 1996, page 655). Bolton et al. agrees with Hoffman et al., suggesting that in 
comparing their data with that of previous studies, they also find differences in the results of the 
games based on the differences in written directions (Gary E. Bolton et al. 1998;Elizabeth 
Hoffman et al. 1999).  
Carpenter et al., had players fill out a personality scale called the Mach scale (first 
developed in (R. Christie, F. Geis 1970)), which consists of 20 statements drawn from 
Machiavelli’s The Prince to which subjects agree or disagree (Jeffrey Carpenter et al. 2005). 
Those who tend to agree with the statements are the high Machs and the others the low Machs. 
They included the Mach scale to control for “variations in predispositions toward engaging in 
manipulative behaviors.” In previous work, (H.-D. Meyer 1992) found evidence suggesting that 
high Machs accept low offers and reciprocate less (A. Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2002). Burks et al. 
found that high Machs were also less trusting, sending less and rejecting higher amounts (S. 
Burks et al. 2003). McCabe et al., however found that Christie and Geis's Machiavellianism 
scale (Mach-IV) is not a good predictive tool to measure the trust of subjects in the trust game 
(Kevin McCabe et al. 2002). 
As there is substantial debate over why humans use costly punishment, Xiao and Houser 
tested experimentally if constraints on emotion expression would increase, decrease, or keep the 
same, the use of costly punishment (Erte Xiao, Daniel Houser 2005). They found that rejection 
of unfair offers was significantly less frequent when DM2s could convey their feelings to DM1s 
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concurrently with their decisions. Their data supports the view that punishment might be used to 
express the negative emotions players feel when they are treated unfairly.  
fMRI 
Sanfey et al. noted that the magnitude of activation in the bilateral anterior insula, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (using fMRI) were 
significantly greater for unfair offers from human partners then from computer partners (A. G. 
Sanfey et al. 2003). They also found the magnitude of activation to be significantly greater in 
both sides of the insula for unfair offers from human partners than to both unfair offers from 
computer partners and low control offers. The insula is associated with the feeling of negative 
emotions. For example, Singer et al., found in an fMRI experiment that the insula is associated 
with the feeling of pain of a loved one (Tania Singer et al. 2004) and Wager et al., found that the 
insula is also able to partake in placebo-effects of suggestions of investigation (Tor D. Wager et 
al. 2004). They suggest that these activations were not solely a function of the amount of money 
offered but rather they were sensitive to the context, the perceived unfair treatment from another 
human. Regions of “bilateral anterior insula demonstrated sensitivity to the degree of unfairness 
of an offer, exhibiting significantly greater activation for a $9:$1 offer than an $8:$2 offer from a 
human partner” (A. G. Sanfey et al. 2003 page 1756).  
Sanfey et al.’s findings are in conflict with the results of Rilling et al., (James K. Rilling 
et al. 2004) who used fMRI for experimenting with UG and PD games, using human and 
computer partners. In Rilling’s team’s experiments of UG, the scanned participants were always 
in the role of DM2. Unfair offers by humans were rejected at a significantly higher rate than the 
same offers by computers, as was also found by Sanfey et al. in 2003 (A. G. Sanfey et al. 2003). 
However, Rilling et al. found that while playing the with computer partners, they got different 
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results for playing UG or prisoner’s dilemma (PD). While playing the UG, computer partners did 
not activate the same regions in the brain as did playing with real people. In other words, the 
scanned participants’ brain actively distinguished between playing with a computer or a person. 
Each participant in the scanner knew the identity of the other player, even when the other player 
was a computer—there was no deception. In spite of knowing that the scanned partner was 
playing against a computer, when playing the PD game, playing with computer partners elicited 
the same brain activation in the scanned DM2 than when playing with a real human partner.  
Put differently, in PD game, the brain is not able to distinguish between playing against a 
computer or a person, even when all facts are clearly stated to the scanned participant. Several 
areas, including right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and right parietal lobe were activated in both 
cases. Event-related plots for both of these regions of interests (ROIs) reveal an increase in 
activation in response to the partner’s face (could be computer “face” in case of a computerized 
partner) that remain elevated until the game outcome is revealed, at which time there is a 
secondary increase—in other words, when image is seen, there is an expectation until the offer is 
revealed. Rilling et al. found that there was a notable discrepancy between the UG and the PD 
games in the ability of computer partners to elicit activation in areas also activated by human 
partners. They suggest that this difference may relate to the varying “responsiveness” of the two 
computer strategies. In the UG game, the computer did not respond to participant choices; it 
simply made the participant an offer. But in the PD game, the computer responded to a choice by 
the participant and gave the impression that the computer’s decision was contingent on the 
human participant’s choice. Mutual cooperation and the punishment of defectors activate reward 
related neural circuits, suggesting that evolution has endowed humans with mechanisms to 
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render altruistic behavior psychologically and physiologically rewarding (Ernst Fehr, Bettina 
Rockenbach 2004). 
The results of recent years’ experiences provide support for the hypothesis that neural 
representations of emotional states guide human decision-making. Sanfey found that the anterior 
insula scales monotonically to the degree of unfairness felt by the participant, reflecting the 
emotional response to the offer (A. G. Sanfey et al. 2003). Unfair offers were also associated 
with increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex. Areas of anterior insula—maybe 
representing the emotional reaction to unfairness— and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC)—maybe representing the cognitive part for earning money—represent areas for 
decision-making in UG. Other recent neuroeconomics studies that scan subjects’ brains while 
they are making decisions in interactive economic experiments also provide interesting results on 
the neural foundations of reciprocity (K. McCabe et al. 2001;J. K. Rilling et al. 2002;R. Adolphs 
2003;A. G. Sanfey et al. 2003;D. J-F. DeQuervain et al. 2004). These studies support the 
hypothesis that neural representations of emotional states guide human decision-making and that 
subjects derive specific rewards from mutual cooperation and the punishment of norm violators. 
Learning effects form expectation and adaptation in brain cells. For example, drug 
addiction is a form of learning effect, called “incentive learning,” where if the neurons’ 
expectation of the upcoming drug is not met, withdrawal follows. During “withdrawal, rats with 
previous experience of heroin in withdrawal initiated drug-seeking with a shorter latency, and 
showed more completed cycles of drug-seeking compared to either saline controls or control 
groups without experience” (D. M. Hutcheson et al. 2001) page 944. Thus learning-effects 
modify behavior and in many lab experiments with humans, such learning effects may be 
substantial but has been difficult to capture. 
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It is clearly evident from this review that we have come a long way from the self-
regarding and measurably wealth-maximizing Homo economicus models and are making strong 
advances in the understanding of economic exchange from a behavioral and physiological 
perspective. The reader most certainly has noticed how two games, the UG and the DG, 
originally used to measure the accuracy of game-theoretic predictions, have metamorphosed into 
a means to explain evolutionary forces, hormonal stress responses, sexually dimorphic emotions, 
and now the neural representations of emotional states! 
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